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Future Oversight of Recombinant DNAResearch
RecommendationsofanInstituteofMedicineCommittee
TheNational InstitutesofHealth (NIH)establishedthe
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) in 1974
in response to public concerns about the safety of ma-
nipulating genetic material through recombinant DNA
(rDNA).1 JesseGelsinger’sdeathduringagenetic therapy
trial in 1999 furthergalvanizedsocietal apprehensions.2
The RAC—a federal advisory committee to the NIH di-
rector—performsmultiple functions: reviewing all gene
transfer protocols, selecting specific protocols for pub-
lic review, and acting as a national forum for rDNA
research.3 Through its Gene Transfer Safety Assess-
ment Board theRAC also surveils, aggregates, and ana-
lyzesadverseeventsacrossallhumangenetransfer trials.
Althoughsocietal concernshavenotentirelyabated,
theaccumulationof40yearsofexperiencewithgenetrans-
fer researchhas led toabetterunderstandingandaccep-
tanceoftherisksandpotentialbenefits.Consequently,only
approximately20%ofall protocols submitted to theNIH
arecurrently selected foradditionalpublic review; there-
maining are approvedwithout additional review.4
As gene transfer research has matured, the com-
plexity of the overall regulatory environment has re-
mained. Gene transfer research continues to be sub-
jected to multiple layers of review: the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), institutional reviewboards (IRBs),
institutional biosafety committees (IBCs), and theRAC.
By regulation, the FDA, IRB, and IBC must all approve
rDNA research; although the RAC is technically advi-
sory, in practice, it has becomeaprerequisite for the re-
search to proceed. The partly overlapping functions of
these regulatorybodies reveal tensionsamongcompet-
ing values: protection of research participantswhile fa-
cilitatingscientificprogress; transparencywhileprotect-
ingpersonal privacy andproprietarydata; andeffective
oversightwhilenotneedlesslyencumberingscientific in-
vestigation.
It is within the context of overlapping regulatory
authorityand improvedscientificunderstandingandso-
cial acceptance that the NIH commissioned the Insti-
tute ofMedicine (IOM) to assesswhether gene transfer
research continues towarrant additional oversight, es-
pecially for individual clinical protocol review.5Theover-
arching goal was to ensure patient safety and the ethi-
cal conduct of research while not subjecting scientists
to unnecessary regulatory burdens, which can impede
or delay scientific exploration andmedical innovation.
Limit RACOversight
to Extraordinary Circumstances
The RAC engendered trust and public confidence in an
emergingareaof science,which, at the timeof its found-
ing, was deeply controversial. It provided expertise to
informthescientific community, alleviatepublicmisgiv-
ings, and guide the NIH at the complex intersection of
science and bioethics.
Most gene transfer research today, however, is no
longer sufficiently novel, ethically problematic, or so-
cially controversial to justify such intensive scrutiny—
above theoversight afforded similar areas of clinical re-
search. The concerns that led to the creationof theRAC
have largely abated over 4 decades, including the cre-
ation of transmissible pathogens, unintentional germ-
line modification or contamination, and harm to third
parties or society at large.6 Existing regulatory bodies,
moreover, are charged with and capable of effectively
overseeing the vast majority of rDNA research.
The RAC’s function of reviewing selected indi-
vidual protocols, in particular, rarely adds value to the
existing regulatory framework, while posing signifi-
cant delays and administrative burdens.7 Although a
small number of gene transfer protocols may continue
to warrant public review, over time the FDA, IRBs, and
IBCs should be able to effectively undertake all over-
sight functions. To achieve this goal, the expertise and
capacities of existing regulatory bodies should be
expanded. In addition, the criteria for the RAC’s selec-
tion of individual protocols should be reformed, as
described below.
The safety of human researchparticipants remains
theparamountconcern,butadditionaloversight should
not be required unless it affords a corresponding ben-
efit; regulation without added value impedes scientific
progress. The IOM committee therefore recom-
mended that the RAC should review individual proto-
cols only if other regulatory authorities could not ad-
equatelydosoand thestudymeetsoneof the following
criteria: (1) the protocol uses a new vector, genetic ma-
terial, or delivery method representing a first-in-
human experience, thus presenting unknown risks; (2)
the protocol relies on preclinical safety data obtained
using a new preclinical model system of unknown and
unconfirmed value; or (3) the protocol involves a vec-
tor, gene construct, or method of delivery associated
with possible toxicities that are not widely known. Be-
yondthesediscretecriteria, theNIH, inconsultationwith
IRBs and IBCs, should be able to require public review
of individual protocols if the director believes there are
wider social and ethical concerns.
Theexpertiseandauthorityof theRACarebestused
to provide additional oversight only in exceptional cir-
cumstances when the above criteria are fulfilled. The
central characteristics of the RAC, such as transpar-
ency and inclusive engagement—keyprinciples of good
governance—should continue. Notably, the IOM com-
mittee recommended that the NIH director, in consul-
tation with IRBs and IBCs, should select protocols for
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review—as opposed to the existing mechanism for protocol selec-
tion by RACmembers.
Byworking in consultationwith the existing regulatory bodies,
theNIH could enhance oversight capacities consistentwith the au-
thority and responsibilities for which they are entrusted. This on-
goingcollaborativeprocesswouldalso,over time, further reducethe
necessity of the RAC’s protocol review functions.
Evolution of Oversight of Emerging Clinical Research
Gene transfer research no longer poses risks or societal concerns
that can be regarded as unique in modern science. Contemporary
laboratory and clinical research often shares characteristics similar
to those of gene transfer studies 40 years ago. Nanotechnology,
for example, presents fundamental scientific questions about the
chemical, optical, and other properties of familiar materials in
unfamiliar sizes. In human applications, these novel questions may
render it difficult to assess the safety of clinical trials, as well as the
risks to the workforce handling the materials and the risks to the
environment into which the materials are excreted. Synthetic biol-
ogy can raise societal concerns about the appropriate scope of
human endeavors to shape the natural world. Neurobiology can
blur the line between what is commonly thought of today as body
and soul as it probes the underexplored world of cognition and
human behavior.
Gene transfer research no longer stands alone as the only
human application of an emerging technology that could benefit
from additional oversight. Nor is it even necessarily the most
deserving of such attention. Consequently, the IOM committee
recommended that the NIH director charge a standing or new
committee to examine the need for additional or different over-
sight for clinical applications of emerging technologies that pose
novel risks. A new process for overseeing novel research across
scientific realms could be modeled on the most innovative and
effective functions of the RAC: providing a public forum for
review and discussion of emerging science; partnering and con-
sulting with and educating local review bodies; fostering scientific
and public awareness; and enhancing the capacity to surveil,
aggregate, and analyze adverse events across related trials of
emerging technologies.
Although modeling a new process on the best features of the
RAC could improve oversight, there are also equally viable options.
A process to review multiple spheres of evolving science, for ex-
ample, could bebuilt around thewidely discussed idea of a central-
ized IRB that couldprovide subjectmatter expertise for specific sci-
entific enterprises.Whateverprocessesareadopted,however, they
should complement, not duplicate or hamper, the work of existing
oversight bodies. A key feature of future regulatory reform of hu-
man subjects research is that it must be limited to rare circum-
stances, such as when existing bodies lack the capacity or there is
significant societal concern.
The future of clinical trial oversight needs to reinforce and aug-
mentexisting institutional capacities andexpertise so that theneed
for additional review becomes a rare occurrence. That would fulfill
the admirable goals of rigorous safeguards for research partici-
pants, consistency of application across scientific realms, and the
imperative of advancing important scientific discoveries.
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